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NOTE
EMPTY PROMISES: MIRANDA WARNINGS IN
NONCUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
Aurora Maoz*
"You have the right to remain silent; anything you say can be used against
you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney; if you cannot af-
ford an attorney, one will be provided to you at the state's expense." In
2010, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to resolve the question of
what courts should do when officers administer Miranda warnings in a sit-
uation where a suspect is not already in custody-in other words, when
officers are not constitutionally required to give or honor these warnings.
While most courts have found a superfluous warning to be harmless, social
science research suggests that this conclusion is misguided. This Note pro-
poses that courts use a rebuttable presumption that a suspect is in custody
once the warnings are read. This solution serves two functions. First, it
prevents officers from using the promise of the warnings, coupled with a
failure to honor the rights promised, as a method of coercing suspects into
speaking. Second, it honors the reality that the vast majority of people be-
lieve that they are under arrest and therefore in custody once officers
administer the Miranda warnings.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODU CTION .................................................................................... 1310
I. MIRANDA'S LEGACY: THE COURT ADDS SAFEGUARDS TO
PREVENT COERCION IN POLICE INTERROGATIONS ................. 1314
A . The M iranda D octrine ..................................................... 1315
B. M iranda and Custody ...................................................... 1316
C. Voluntariness Doctrine Post-Miranda ............................. 1318
II. TRENDS IN POLICE PRACTICES: How OFFICERS MANIPULATE
DELIVERY OF THE MIRANDA WARNINGS AND WITHHOLD
PROMISED RIGHTS TO COERCE SUSPECTS ............................... 1319
* J.D., December 2011, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the
entire staff of the Michigan Law Review and the many others who have contributed to the
development of this Note. Thanks to my faculty advisor Professor Sonja Starr and to my note
editors Dana Roizen, Robert Boley, and Emily Huang for their hours of editing, insightful
comments, and suggestions. I would also like to thank Professor David Moran and Christo-
pher Kemmitt for their feedback on earlier drafts of this Note, as well as Professor Eve
Brensike Primus for talking through my topic with me and providing an additional perspec-
tive. Thanks to Tanya Jenkins for providing the inspiration for this Note and Corinne Beckwith
for helping me to develop this topic. Thanks also to Claire Pavlovic for sharing her case re-
search with me. Lastly, I thank Laurie Maoz, for providing a helpful lay perspective and,
Andrew Gordon, for his love and support.
1309
Michigan Law Review
A. Police Interrogators Often Deliberately Manipulate
the Miranda Warnings and Boundaries of Custody
to Avoid Constitutional Restraints ................................... 1320
B. Officers Coerce Through Ignoring Requests
for Counsel or Silence as Promised ................................ 1322
1. Issuing the Warnings Signifies Arrest ....................... 1324
2. Denying Suspects' Invocations of
Miranda Rights Coerces ........................................... 1325
III. STRATEGIES FOR PRACTITIONERS AND COURTS:
ADVOCATING A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF CUSTODY .................................................... 1328
A. Adding a Rebuttable Presumption to
the Custodial Analysis ..................................................... 1329
1. The Seibert D ecision ................................................. 1329
2. Extending Seibert to Create a
Rebuttable Presum ption ............................................ 1331
B . Alternative Solutions ....................................................... 1334
1. Freestanding Exclusionary Rule ............................... 1334
2. Factor A pproach ........................................................ 1335
3. Solution Under Voluntariness ................................... 1337
C ON CLU SION ....................................................................................... 1340
INTRODUCTION
Miranda's familiar warnings have "become part of our national culture."1
Yet the limitations of the Miranda protections likely are not as well-known.
The Supreme Court's revolutionary decision in Miranda v. Arizona requires a
government officer to communicate the Miranda warnings to a suspect, but
only under specific circumstances.2 Namely, the Constitution only requires
that an officer read the warnings, and that a suspect agree to abandon, or
"waive," her rights to silence or counsel, before an officer conducts an inter-
rogation of the suspect in custody3-- defined as a physical environment akin
to formal arrest.4 A person found not to be in custody-as defined by the
Court-has no protection under Miranda. Developments in Supreme Court
case law since Miranda have allowed police officers a significant end run
1. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1000 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
3. To prove a valid waiver, the government must demonstrate that a suspect made an
informed, knowing, and voluntary relinquishment of her privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 475; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (finding an implied
waiver of the right to silence). Furthermore, a person who initially waives her rights can reas-
sert either her right to silence or her right to counsel-what is referred to as an "invocation."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. Once a suspect invokes either of these rights during custodial
interrogation, officers must stop questioning for the time being or run afoul of Miranda. Id.
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
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around awarding suspects the Miranda protections.5 Such developments
have allowed officers to take wide latitude in conducting interrogations in
scenarios without formal restraint and that are only nominally noncustodial
in order to avoid Miranda's requirements. 6 This alone is troubling given that
officers pressure, trick, and intimidate suspects to speak,7 and elicit false
confessions, even in situations where a person may not be in a physical envi-
ronment like formal arrest.'
But officers often read the warnings in noncustodial interrogations when
the warnings are not required. For example, in one special victims unit, of-
ficers engaged in the practice of Mirandizing every interviewee, even when
suspects were clearly not in custody.9 At best, officers might do this to be on
the safe side when they are not sure if a person in custody.1" At worst, a gra-
tuitous reading is an effort to falsely win the sympathy of the suspect."
Regardless of the reason, problems arise when a person responds to unnec-
essary Miranda warnings with a request for counsel or to remain silent.
While many courts have held that there are no constitutional problems when
the police ignore such a request,12 this Note argues that this prevailing ap-
proach is misguided.
Exactly this situation arose in Davis v. Allsbrooks.13 A police officer
went to James Davis's house and left him a note requesting that he go to the
police station to speak with officers because they wanted to question him
about a homicide. 14 Davis went to the stationhouse two days later, where the
police gave him Miranda warnings and where he signed a written waiver of
his rights.15 Officers then questioned him for about two hours, and he offered
information tending to show his innocence.' 6 The officers asked Davis to leave
for two hours and then return. 7 When Davis did not come back, officers
5. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121-22 (1983).
6. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1544 (2008).
7. See Emily Bretz, Note, Don't Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana Relaxes Po-
lice Restrictions for Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REV. 221, 237-40
(2010).
8. See, e.g., State v. Lapointe, 678 A.2d 942, 957-58 (Conn. 1996). This case has been
referenced as a highly probable case of false confession to murder. Richard A. Leo & Richard
J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages
of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429,
459-61 (1998).
9. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 882 (1996).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1966),
12. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
13. 778 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985).
14. Davis, 778 F.2d at 169-70.
15. Id. at 170.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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found him walking near his house and drove him to the police station. 8 At
the stationhouse, officers again administered Miranda warnings, and Davis
again waived his rights.' 9 He then told the officers he no longer wanted to
talk about the case. 20 Rather than cease questioning, the officers continued
to interrogate Davis, placing bloody pictures of the crime scene in front of
him.21 He began to cry, asked to use the restroom, and was accompanied
there by officers.2 2 Finally, after using the restroom a second time, he con-
fessed to the murder.23 His confession was admitted against him at trial
despite the fact that he had clearly stated that he wanted to remain silent
after receiving the Miranda warnings. 24 The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision to admit the statement. 25 Because Davis was not in custody,
the Fourth Circuit concluded, the officers were not required to stop ques-
tioning him when he said he wished to remain silent.26 This reasoning was
adopted in 2010 by the D.C. Court of Appeals.27
This result is surprising given that Davis was told that it was his right to
remain silent, but when he invoked that right, the police blatantly disregard-
ed his request. Actions like those taken by the officers in Davis v. Allsbrooks
have profound effects on suspects that must be acknowledged. The vast ma-
jority of people associate the reading of one's Miranda rights with the act of
formal arrest,28 and so reasonably feel that their movement is restricted after
an administration of the warnings. Furthermore, administering the warnings
while failing to honor a request for an attorney or to remain silent carries a
serious risk of coercion. 29 Evidence shows that it is common for officers to
exploit this coercive pressure by intentionally violating suspects' Miranda
rights in custodial interrogations. After giving the warnings, they often con-
tinue to interrogate suspects after a suspect invokes a right to silence or to an
attorney.30 This tactic--called "questioning outside Miranda"-is a power-
ful way to coerce suspects into speaking by violating an express promise of
their rights. 3
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 172.
26. Id.
27. Jenkins v. United States, Nos. 07-CF-488 & 07-CF-1353, slip op. at 8-9 (D.C. July
9, 2010) (citing Davis, 778 F.2d at 172) (on file with author), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1472
(2011).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 122-127.
29. See Ex parte Comer, 591 So. 2d 13, 16 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Tukes v. Dugger, 911
F.2d 508, 516 n.l 1 ( lIth Cir. 1990)).
30. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 133 (1998).
31. Id. at 132-40, 159.
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Many federal and state jurisdictions have adjudicated disputes over the
admission of statements taken from defendants after use of what will be
termed the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice-where (1) officers administer the
Miranda warnings when the warnings are not required, and then (2) contin-
ue to question suspects who respond by trying to exercise their right to
remain silent or to counsel.3 2 However, many of these same courts fail to
acknowledge any of the potential problems noted above. Some courts simp-
ly do not take into account the effect of gratuitous warnings when ruling on
the admissibility of subsequent statements. 33 Other courts explicitly state
that the gratuitous reading of the Miranda warnings should have no bearing
on the admissibility of a statement.3 4 Still, others purport to address the
warnings in a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. The one outlier is a
state court that has adopted a freestanding rule excluding any statements
made after requests for counsel or silence because of the risk of coercion if a
suspect invokes a promised right and officers continue questioning.3 6 De-
spite the number of jurisdictions where this problem has arisen, there is no
clear answer to the controversy, given that noncustodial interrogation falls
outside the realm of Miranda,37 and the voluntariness doctrine-which is
also determinative of a statement's admissibility in court-has gone under-
developed since Miranda.3
This Note argues that the Constitution requires a safeguard to ensure that
once the warnings are read in an interrogation, officers secure a waiver and
honor any subsequent invocations of the right to counsel or the right to si-
lence. The best way to satisfy this demand is by putting in place a rebuttable
presumption that once the warnings are administered, the suspect is in
32. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jenkins, No. 07-CF-488.
33. E.g., State v. Lapointe, 678 A.2d 942, 958 & n.41 (Conn. 1996); Hunt v. State, 687
So. 2d 1154, 1160 (Miss. 1996); State v. Carroll, 645 A.2d 82, 87-88 (N.H. 1994); State v.
Middleton, 640 S.E.2d 152, 158-61 (W. Va. 2006).
34. See United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 693 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing United
States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1977)); Lewis, 556 F.2d at 449; People v. Bailey,
527 N.YS.2d 845, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 610 A.2d 1013,
1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); State v. Martindale, No. 15687-7-1I1, 1997 WL 705445, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1997); see also Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 194 (Fla. 2010)
(citing reasoning in lower court's opinion on a related question under the Fourth Amendment
in Caldwell v. State, 985 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)); Ann F Walsh, Note,
Should Unnecessary Warnings Wrap a Suspect in the Panoply of Miranda Protections?, 10
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 135 (2005). Walsh argues as part of her thesis that any
"mistaken warnings," including gratuitous ones in noncustodial settings, should be entirely
ignored in a determination of custody because any other result would hamstring officers.
Walsh, supra, at 137.
35. United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 1998); Sprosty v.
Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 & n.1
(4th Cir. 1985); Caldwell, 41 So. 3d at 202 (discussing custody under the Fourth Amendment);
State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (N.D. 1991).
36. Exparte Comer, 591 So. 2d 13, 15-16, 16 n.2 (Ala. 1991).
37. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
38. See infra Section I.B.
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custody absent proof to the contrary. Part I outlines the basics of the Su-
preme Court's interrogation case law, highlighting the constitutional
backdrop that prevents the government from admitting coerced statements
against a criminal defendant. At the same time, Part I points out how the
doctrine-including its applications in lower courts-currently falls short by
allowing coercive police tactics in noncustodial interrogations to go largely
unreviewed. Part II discusses the risk of coercion created by the Davis v.
Allsbrooks practice. Part III presents remedies to this problem, concluding
that the best solution is for courts to implement a rebuttable presumption of
custody once the warnings are administered.
I. MIRANDA'S LEGACY: THE COURT ADDS SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT
COERCION IN POLICE INTERROGATIONS
To address the problems presented by the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice, it
is necessary to first understand the constitutional protections that do exist to
deter police from coercing suspects during interrogations. These are derived
from the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Due Process Clause.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person
shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."39 The Self-Incrimination Clause is understood to protect an
accusatorial system of justice,4' meaning that government officers are con-
stitutionally required to obtain convictions by evidence "independently and
freely secured."41 To this end, the Fifth Amendment prohibits government
officers from proving guilt by relying on statements of an accused about the
allegations against her obtained by the use of compulsion or, as the Court
generally terms it, coercion.42 It follows that statements obtained through
coercion are generally not admissible against the accused at trial.43 Before
Miranda came down in 1966, however, the Supreme Court mainly used a
voluntariness test grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause44 to determine whether a suspect's statements during police interro-
gations had been freely given.4 The voluntariness inquiry examines the
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V, incorporated by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
40. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 7.
41. Id. at8.
42. Id. One scholar discusses the difference between compulsion and coercion:
While the self-incrimination clause ... uses "compel" rather than "coerce," the historical
evidence suggests that the Framers were concerned about purposive, governmental coer-
cion rather than compulsion .... The question in a self-incrimination case is not, after
all, whether [the suspect] should be blamed for her act of confessing but is, instead,
whether the government should be allowed to use the confession.
George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 79, 85 (1993).
43. See Hogan, 378 U.S. at 8.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
45. Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
2001, 2002-03 (1998).
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totality of the circumstances, including the physical and mental characteris-
tics and abilities of the suspect, to ask whether the interrogation methods
were sufficient to "overbear the will" of the suspect.4 6 Miranda was prompt-
ed out of concern by scholars and jurists that the voluntariness approach did
not provide sufficient guidance to law enforcement agencies and courts to
protect adequately suspects' rights against self-incrimination in interroga-
tions. 47
A. The Miranda Doctrine
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court issued three revolutionary holdings that
changed the landscape of the law surrounding interrogations.4 8 "First, the
Court held that informal pressure to speak-that is, pressure not backed by
legal process or any formal sanction-can constitute 'compulsion' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."4 9 Second, it held that this informal
compulsion is automatically present during custodial interrogation." Third,
it held that, before engaging in custodial interrogation without counsel pre-
sent, police are required to inform suspects of their rights to silence and to
counsel, and to obtain a knowing, voluntary, and informed waiver of those
rights.51 To ensure governmental compliance with this requirement, it "con-
ditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on warning a
suspect of his rights"52 and obtaining a waiver.5 3 The warnings were intend-
ed "as a protective measure[,] placing the citizen on guard 'that he is not in
the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.' "I'
46. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991).
47. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-42 & n.2 (1966); White, supra note 45,
at 2003.
48. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436
(1987) ("[T]hree conceptually distinct steps were involved in the Court's decision.").
49. Id.; accord Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466; WELSH S. WHITE, Miranda's WANING PRO-
TECTIONs 4 (2001) ("In Miranda, the Court broke new constitutional ground by holding that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to the pretrial interrogation
of suspects in custody."). But see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (determining that
the Fifth Amendment cannot be violated until a statement is used against an accused at trial).
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; Schulhofer, supra note 48, at 106.
51. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel may not attach at
the point of an interrogation if the interrogation takes place before an accused has had an ini-
tial appearance before a judicial officer. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213
(2008). Miranda recognized a limited Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial
interrogation to ensure that suspects exercise their free will to speak. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
469. However, waiving Fifth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogation will
generally suffice to waive Sixth Amendment rights during that interrogation. See Montejo v.
Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090-92 (2009).
52. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004). It is immaterial whether the state-
ment made is inculpatory or exculpatory. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
54. Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 202 (Fla. 2010) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 496).
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To prevent officers from persuading unwilling suspects into abandoning
their rights, the Court continued to restrict police tactics after Miranda.
Specifically, it held that the police must immediately stop questioning when
an individual invokes a right to silence or to counsel after an initial decision
to waive those rights.5" The Court held that "an accused ... having ex-
pressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made avail-
able to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police. '56 An invocation of the right to
counsel is understood as the suspect indicating her inability to "deal with
police pressures without legal assistance."57 The Court also held that alt-
hough interrogation must cease once a suspect invokes the right to silence
after an initial waiver, the police are permitted to return two hours later,
re-Mirandize the suspect, and continue questioning under limited circum-
stances. 5
8
B. Miranda and Custody
The Court made clear in Miranda that the "inherently compelling pres-
sures" giving rise to a duty to issue the warnings are only presumed to exist
when the suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation.5 9 The Court
focused on these two conditions because of the impermissibly high risk of
coerced confessions coming out of increasingly common "incommunicado
interrogation[s]" 6 -in which suspects were questioned alone by law en-
forcement officers trained in using tactics to "persuade, trick, or cajole [the
suspect] out of exercising [her] constitutional rights."61 The concern was that
these interrogations would produce a large number of coerced confessions
that would escape detection under the malleable, post hoc voluntariness
55. For the invocation of the right to counsel, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), and Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (police can reinterrogate fourteen
days after release from custody despite earlier invocation of counsel). For invocation of the
right to silence, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
56. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The request for counsel must be unambiguous to
count as an invocation. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455, 459 (1994) (finding the
statement "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer" not sufficiently clear to be an invocation).
57. Bretz, supra note 7, at 227 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988)).
58. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06 (stating that if the second interrogation is restricted to a
crime different from the one discussed in the previous interrogation, re-Mirandizing the sus-
pect may allow continued interrogation). The Court recently decided that the invocation of a
right to silence must also be unambiguous. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260
(2010).
59. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). The Court later defined interro-
gation as "express questioning or its functional equivalent," meaning "any words or actions on
the part of the police... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
60. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
61. Id. at455.
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standard.62 One integral premise underlying Miranda is that the presence of
the custodial element distinguishes those interrogations that are inherently
coercive from those that are not.63 This assumption may have been prompted
by interrogation manuals' emphasis on "isolating suspects and depriving
them of outside support."64 Thus, taking its cue from the tactics that interro-
gators found the most successful at getting suspects to talk, the Court used
the term "custody" to identify those interrogations where the tactics being
used were also those most likely to compel a suspect to speak.
65
The Court later refined the custody inquiry to ask, under the circum-
stances of a particular interrogation, the following: "[Wiould a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave[?]' '66 Ultimately, a reviewing court must take into account the rele-
vant circumstances to objectively determine whether there was" 'formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal
arrest. '67 Like the voluntariness inquiry before it,65 the custody inquiry has
become very fact intensive. Relevant factors include the location of ques-
tioning, the length of the interrogation, the accusatory tone of officers, the
use of subterfuge to induce a suspect to speak, the presence or absence of
physical restraints on a suspect's movement, the ability of the suspect to
leave at the end,69 and the age of the suspect in some circumstances.
70
The Court's restriction of Miranda only to custodial interrogations has
important consequences for the permissibility of the Davis v. Allsbrooks
practice. Since Miranda, the Court has suggested that when a suspect in-
vokes her rights outside the context of custodial interrogation, officers do
not have to cease questioning." In California v. Beheler, the Court
62. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
63. Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 1527-28.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Dana Raigrodski, Breaking Out of "Custody": A Feminist Voice in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 461 ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described ... cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak.").
68. The Court before Miranda identified "a long list of factors ranging from physical
brutality to falsely aroused sympathy. The difficulty ... is that the Court's list made 'every-
thing relevant and nothing determinative.'" Thomas, supra note 42, at 95 (footnote omitted)
(quoting Joseph Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over
Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243 (1986)).
69. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2411 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting);
Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases on custody).
70. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406.
71. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.3 (1991) ("We have in fact
never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
Icustodial interrogation'....").
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addressed whether Miranda applied during a brief stationhouse interroga-
tion when officers asked a suspect to come to the police station for
questioning.7 2 Beheler, suspected of murder, appeared at the stationhouse on
his own, after being called to come to the station, and then was allowed to
leave after a twenty-minute period of questioning; he was also told that he
was not under arrest. 73 The Court concluded that this setting was noncusto-
dial, so that the Miranda warnings were not required.74 The Court reasoned
that all police interrogations involve some amount of coercive pressure. 75
This pressure only becomes a constitutional problem requiring officers to
follow the Miranda obligations at the point when a reasonable person would
not feel free to leave.76 Arguably, officers do not have to cease questioning
after a request for an attorney or to remain silent in a noncustodial interroga-
tion because suspects can decide to leave when they no longer feel like
speaking with the officers. 77
C. Voluntariness Doctrine Post-Miranda
Given that the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice arises during noncustodial in-
terrogations, the voluntariness doctrine and its underlying logic hold special
significance. 78 Any statement obtained during police interrogation-
custodial or not-cannot be admitted without a finding that the statement
was made voluntarily. Additionally, the Miranda doctrine was meant to sup-
plement, not supplant, the voluntariness inquiry in lower courts, which still
have to decide whether a statement was voluntarily given regardless of
whether the Miranda dictates were followed. 79 It appears, however, that ra-
ther than engage in both inquiries, some lower courts have used Miranda as
72. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121.
73. Id. at 1122.
74. Id. at 1121.
75. Id. at 1124.
76. See id. at 1123-24. The reasoning in Beheler was imported from Oregon v. Mathia-
son, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) ("Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to
one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the
absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place
in a coercive environment." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009) ("When a defendant is not
in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badger-
ing."); Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 515 (11 th Cir. 1990).
78. Further, violations of these standards carry different remedies. While a finding that
a statement is involuntary requires exclusion of the statement for any purpose, a statement
taken in violation of Miranda can be used to rebut the defendant's case ("impeachment")
though it cannot be used in the prosecution's main case against the defendant ("case-in-
chief"). See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397 & n.12, 398 (1978).
79. See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Har-
bors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030,
1070 (2001); see also Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion,
82 HARv. L. REV. 42, 60 (1968) ("The Miranda warnings of course do not directly affect the
limits set by 'voluntariness' on permissible tactics, but merely add several safeguards.").
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a substitute.8" The failure to conduct a voluntariness analysis is especially
problematic in situations where the Miranda doctrine has no application-
namely, during noncustodial questioning by the police and after suspects
voluntarily waive their rights during custodial interrogation.8' In these situa-
tions, the voluntariness doctrine is currently the only line of inquiry
governing the admissibility of an accused's statement.82
II. TRENDS IN POLICE PRACTICES: How OFFICERS MANIPULATE
DELIVERY OF THE MIRANDA WARNINGS AND WITHHOLD
PROMISED RIGHTS TO COERCE SUSPECTS
This Part presents social science research highlighting the problems that
arise from the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice and similar practices. As dis-
cussed, noncustodial interrogations fall outside the realm of Miranda
because the doctrine offers protections only when a suspect is subject to the
compelling pressures that are thought to be specific to custodial interroga-
tion.83 Police officers have used this technical distinction to design more
sophisticated methods of coaxing suspects into speaking. Section II.A out-
lines the police tactics developed to conduct interrogations in noncustodial
environments to circumvent Miranda, as well as police tactics that manipu-
late the meaning of the warnings as a method of coercing waivers. Section
II.B discusses the psychological research suggesting that the Davis v.
Allsbrooks practice can contribute to coercing a suspect into speaking, thus
implicating the same concerns that motivated Miranda and the voluntariness
doctrine.
80. See Klein, supra note 79, at 1070 & n.184; see also People v. Hicks, 438 N.YS.2d
964, 966-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) ("[T]he Supreme Court decided Mathiason despite the fact
that the defendant was lured into making statements by the questioning officer's false repre-
sentations to him .... The [C]ourt found that the misrepresentations were irrelevant to the
only question concerning the admissibility of his statement, i.e., his noncustodial status." (em-
phasis added)); People v. Kassim, No. 3247/03, 2004 WL 2852665, at *4-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 28, 2004) ("To determine whether the People have met this burden, this court must con-
sider two questions: (1) was the defendant in custody at the time the statement was made, and
(2) was the statement made in response to an inquiry by law enforcement officers."); Weissel-
berg, supra note 30, at 166 ("In the overwhelming majority of cases, a court will find that a
suspect who received proper warnings and waived his or her Fifth Amendment rights made a
voluntary statement.").
81. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 700-01 (12th ed. 2008)
(citing Schulhofer, supra note 48, at 447); see also White, supra note 45, at 2004.
82. See White, supra note 45, at 2004.
83. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
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A. Police Interrogators Often Deliberately Manipulate the
Miranda Warnings and Boundaries of Custody to
Avoid Constitutional Restraints
Officers often manipulate delivery of the warnings and conduct nominal-
ly noncustodial interviews in order to avoid constitutional restraints. The
Davis v. Allbrooks practice is but one iteration of this phenomenon.
It is false that any administration of the warnings is beneficial to sus-
pects in interrogations. Both before and after Miranda, officers have found
ways to frame the warnings so as to convince suspects not to exercise their
rights. As described in the Court's Miranda opinion, a common tactic used
in response to a suspect who was unwilling to talk was to remind the suspect
of her right to remain silent in order to convince her to open up to the inves-
tigator. 4 The hope was that, by informing the suspect of her rights, the
concession would make the interrogator appear more sympathetic and in-
crease the suspect's willingness to speak.85 Then the interrogator was to
follow the concession with an explanation that a suspect who refuses to talk
assumedly "ha[s] something to hide."86 This tactic continues in a post-
Miranda world, where many interrogators deliver the warnings so as to
deliberately downplay their significance. 7 A researcher observed one inter-
rogator state the following before issuing the warnings:
In order for me to talk to you . .. I need to advise you of your rights. It's a
formality. I'm sure you've watched television with the cop shows, right,
and you hear them say their rights and so you can probably recite this bet-
ter than I can, but it's something I need to do and we can [get] this out of
the way before we talk about what's happened.8
Arguably, the compulsion to talk oneself out of trouble is the most pow-
erful in a pre-arrest interrogation-many of which occur in noncustodial
settings-because the person can still secure release if she can convince the
officer of her innocence.8 9 The distinction between an interrogation contem-
poraneous with arrest and a more limited noncustodial or custodial
interrogation is that an "arrest constitutes an indefinite curtailment" of the
suspect on the charged crime until the charge can be resolved through the
judicial process.90 In an arrest-interrogation scenario, 91 a suspect's baseline
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1966); accord Yale Kamisar, What Is an
"Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 731-32 (1963).
85. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 453-54.
86. Id. at 454 (referencing Inbau and Reid's techniques).
87. Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game,
30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 259, 272-74 (1996).
88. Id. at 272.
89. Craig M. Bradley, On 'Custody', TRIAL, Feb. 2005, at 58, 60.
90. See Thomas, supra note 42, at 104.
91. Remember that the Court's definition of custody is "a 'formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler,
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understanding is that she will be held indefinitely absent judicial or prosecu-
torial intervention. 92 By contrast, in a pre-arrest interview, whether custodial
in nature or not, the suspect has the added threat of being arrested if she
does not answer in an exculpatory manner.93
Not surprisingly, the Beheler decision94 has also given law enforcement
officers a powerful tool, allowing them to circumvent the Miranda protec-
tions by keeping interrogations nominally noncustodial. 95 These types of
noncustodial interrogations are common.96 Fred Inbau, who coauthored the
initial police manuals advocating coercive interrogation techniques to
which the Miranda Court reacted,97 has continued to instruct officers on
interrogations and obtaining confessions. 98 He counsels that whenever
possible, officers should conduct formal interrogations in a "noncustodial
environment" to avoid awarding suspects the increased rights that accom-
pany custodial interrogations.99 Further, a study of police training materials
in California reveals the development of a "Beheler admonishment."' 00
Officers call suspects down to the stationhouse for interrogation, and then
inform them that they are not under arrest and are free to leave, thereby
obviating the need-as the training goes-to worry about following the
mandates of Miranda.'0
Some trainings emphasize that Beheler allows officers to decide when
giving the warnings would work strategically in their favor.0 2 For example,
when a suspect who appears on her own at the stationhouse seems coopera-
tive and ready to waive her rights, one prosecutor recommends
administering the warnings and obtaining a waiver, "thus eliminating the
issue altogether."'' 03 But when the suspect appears uncooperative, the "Be-
heler admonishment" without the Miranda warnings should be given to
keep the interview noncustodial."°
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977) (per curiam)).
92. Thomas, supra note 42, at 104-05.
93. As far as noncustodial interviews are concerned, it has been persuasively argued
that people in noncustodial interviews before arrest are "more likely to make an incriminating
statement against their own interests as they try to convince the police of their own inno-
cence." Bradley, supra note 89, at 60.
94. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
95. See Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 1544.
96. Bretz, supra note 7, at 238-39 (gathering evidence of noncustodial interrogations in
studies, scholarly works, and police interrogation manuals).
97. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 n.9 (1966).
98. See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th
ed. 2011).
99. See id. at 89.
100. Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 1544.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1542.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1542-43.
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In sum, police officers have incorporated the warnings into their interro-
gation tactics in a way that proves most advantageous to them, not to a
suspect's rights. The Court's post-Miranda decisions have made room for
these tactics to flourish by allowing officers to easily manipulate the din-
stinction between custodial and noncustodial interrogations.
B. Officers Coerce Through Ignoring Requests for Counsel
or Silence as Promised
There is evidence that a variation on the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice is
used as a coercive tool during custodial interrogations. 10 5 Deliberate ques-
tioning after required Miranda warnings but absent a waiver has been
labeled as "questioning outside Miranda."'' 6 When officers continue to in-
terrogate a suspect absent a waiver or after an invocation of rights, they do
violate Miranda and the accompanying protections. But generally the state-
ment is only excluded from the prosecution's case-in-chief; the statement
can still be used for other purposes-for example, for impeachment-and
physical evidence obtained as a result of the statement need not be exclud-
ed. 07 There is evidence from training manuals, observed interrogations, and
case law that officers across a number of jurisdictions purposely employ this
tactic as a method of exerting pressure on suspects. 08 Interrogators are sig-
naling their complete control over the interrogation: "Nothing communicates
that message more powerfully than an officer's express statement that the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel exist only in theory and that
the officer will not respect them."109
Furthermore, the Supreme Court expects and encourages suspects to rely
on officers' representations of their rights, making the withholding of a
promised right that much more problematic. The Court held in Doyle v.
Ohio that it would be fundamentally unfair, and thus a violation of the Due
Process Clause, to use a defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence against
her in any capacity at trial.I10 Yet in Fletcher v. Weir, the Court determined
that a defendant's postarrest, pre-Miranda silence could be used to impeach
her testimony on cross-examination."' The Court reasoned that implicit in
105. Cf id. at 1537-38 (concluding that the Miranda Court relied on the most successful
tactics to determine which were the most coercive).
106. Weisselberg, supra note 30, at 132-40.
107. See id. at 127-29. It has been convincingly argued that law enforcement officers are
somewhat incentivized to question in clear violation of Miranda during interrogation because
they can still use subsequent statements for impeachment purposes and they can still use any
physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning in violation of Miranda even when the
statement may be excluded. See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?,
112 YALE L.J. 447, 451 (2002). In addition, no violation occurs until a statement is actually
used against the defendant at trial. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 760-61 (2003).
108. Weisselberg, supra note 30, at 127-29, 134.
109. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
110. 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (finding post-Miranda silence inadmissible).
111. 455 U.S 603, 603 (1982) (per curiam) (finding pre-Miranda silence admissible).
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warning a person that she has the "right to remain silent and that anything
stated can be used ... against [her]" ' 12 is the assumption that the decision to
remain silent cannot be used against her." 3 Thus, a suspect cannot fairly be
punished for refusing to speak, after assurances induced her to exercise that
privilege without penalty." 4 The Court made it clear that this rationale de-
pended on the administration of the warnings. Silence was admissible only
when, and because, the warnings had not been administered. 115 The Court
has not addressed whether post-warning silence in a noncustodial situation
is admissible. The Connecticut Supreme Court, however, addressed this ab-
sence in the U.S. Supreme Court case law; it relied on Doyle and Fletcher
when it held inadmissible a suspect's silence after the administration of
Miranda warnings, regardless of whether the suspect was in custody." 6 In
doing so, the Connecticut Supreme Court showed how the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in this area indicates an expectation that suspects rely on the
warnings as administered, regardless of custodial status.
As for the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice specifically, the case law shows
that officers in at least twenty-six local law enforcement agencies across
twenty-two states have administered Miranda warnings before interrogating
individuals in noncustodial settings or in settings where the question of cus-
tody was not clear."' Although at least one officer reported to a researcher
that the officer had concerns that gratuitious warnings could create inadvert-
ently custodial settings," 8 the issue is not prominently featured in the police
training materials where the strategic uses of Beheler are emphasized, at
least in California.' 9 Given the orchestrated use of noncustodial interroga-
tions and the strategic employment of the Miranda warnings, there is strong
evidence that the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice is purposeful.2 0
The next Sections present social science research in combination with a
general framework of coercion to suggest that the warnings communicate
formal arrest in situations that may otherwise appear to lack signs of formal
restraint, and thus increase the tendency for a reasonable suspect to feel that
112. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
113. Doyle, 426 U.S. at618.
114. Id.
115. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
116. State v. Plourde, 545 A.2d 1071, 1076-78 (Conn. 1988).
117. I compiled a listing of these agencies for a case I worked on while interning with
the Public Defender Service for D.C. during the summer of 2011. For this listing of agencies,
with citations to the cases discussing the practice at these agencies of giving Miranda warnings
in noncustodial and other contexts, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jenkins v. United States,
Nos. 07-CF-488 & 07-CF-1353 (D.C. July 9, 2010). It should also be noted that in one special
victims unit, the officers Mirandize all noncustodial interviewees. Cassell & Hayman, supra
note 9, at 882. The local prosecutor in the jurisdiction where this unit operates opined that law
enforcement followed this practice in order to accommodate a broader definition of custody at
the state level in Utah. Id.
118. Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 1545.
119. See id. at 1542-45.
120. See supra Section II.A.
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she cannot leave. 121 In addition, there is a high risk of coercion that arises
when a suspect invokes her right to remain silent or her right to counsel, and
that request is not respected despite promises to the contrary. The evidence
strongly suggests that, from the suspect's point of view, being given the Mi-
randa warnings in noncustodial settings when they are not required likely
produces a worse outcome than not reading the warnings.
1. Issuing the Warnings Signifies Arrest
Most people enter an interrogation with law enforcement with the idea
that the warnings signify arrest. Even as far back as 1984, 93 percent of par-
ticipants in a national survey pool knew they had a right to an attorney if
arrested, 122 and a national poll in 1991 found that 80 percent of those sur-
veyed knew that they had a right to remain silent if arrested. 23 Thus, an
overwhelming majority of people associate the Miranda rights with the pub-
lic "spectacle" of formal arrest. 24 In one case where the controversy at issue
in this Note was litigated, the defendant expressed exactly this sentiment at
her suppression hearing. 21 She testified that after she voluntarily appeared
at a police stationhouse, an officer administered the warnings, and her first
response after refusing to waive her rights was to ask the officer, "[W]hy am
I being arrested?"' 126 Given the strength of the association between the
Miranda warnings and formal arrest, a person likely would not feel the in-
creased level of freedom associated with noncustodial interrogation-for
example, being able to get up and leave the interrogation or make a phone
call to a lawyer-after the warnings have been administered. 127
121. The coercive potential of gratuitous Miranda warnings stems from popular misun-
derstandings about Miranda rights, in particular the custody requirement. See Richard Rogers
et al., "Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights ", 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 300, 300, 305
(2010) (detailing these public misperceptions and citing Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of
Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005), for
the proposition that many people misunderstand the custody requirement). Even courts'
determinations about what constitutes "custody" have become entirely unpredictable. See
George L. Blum, Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" of Adult by Police
Officer within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect Be Informed of Federal
Constitutional Rights before Custodial Interrogation, 29 A.L.R. 6th 1, 22 (2007) (noting splits
of authority on three key custodial issues).
122. Id. at 672 (citing Jeffrey Toobin, Viva Miranda, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 16, 1987,
at 11, 11).
123. Id. (citing SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 51 (1993)).
124. Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 201-02 (Fla. 2010); see also supra notes 122-123.
125. Brief for Appellant at 3-6, Slwooko v. State, 139 P.3d 593 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006)
(No. A-8747), 2004 WL 5038533 at *3-6.
126. Id. at 3.
127. See id.; contra Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 296 n.26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
("We believe that the defendant's remedy in a noncustodial setting where the police continue
questioning the defendant after the defendant has unambiguously invoked his right to silence
is simply to get up and leave.").
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2. Denying Suspects' Invocations of Promised
Miranda Rights Coerces
There is an arguably greater risk that arises during the second crucial
moment of a noncustodial interrogation-when a suspect refuses to wave or
invokes the right to an attorney or to remain silent and officers deny a clear
request after making promises to the contrary. Returning to the case exam-
ple in the Introduction, because the Fourth Circuit found that Davis was not
in custody, the court was unperturbed by the officers' failure to honor Davis'
invocation of his right to remain silent. 28 It explained the reasoning behind
its decision:
To hold that the giving of Miranda warnings automatically disables police
from further questioning upon a suspect's slightest indication to discontin-
ue a dialogue would operate as a substantial disincentive to police to
inform suspects of their constitutional protections. It would convert admi-
rable precautionary measures on the part of officers into an investigatory
obstruction. 2 9
In reality, the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Davis condones a practice
with a high risk of coercion. 130 It is also difficult to understand why courts
would encourage officers to relay constitutional protections that are illusory.
Nevertheless, this reasoning is pervasive across jurisdictions. 3'
Examining the Supreme Court's confession cases from the pre-Warren
Court era to the present sheds light on the type of coercion the Court has
sought, and continues to seek, to prevent. 3 2 An account of coercion that one
scholar tracks as closely resembling the Supreme Court's jurisprudence fol-
lows five steps: (1) the officer or the government threatens to do something
to the suspect if the suspect does not answer the questions in a satisfactory
way, and the officer is cognizant that he is making the threat; (2) not answer-
ing the questions is rendered "substantially less eligible as a course of
conduct" than without the threat;'33 (3) the officer makes the threat in order
to get the suspect to answer the officer's questions in a satisfactory way, in-
tending that the suspect understand the threat; (4) the suspect actually
128. See Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985).
129. Id. at 172.
130. See Ex-parte Comer, 591 So. 2d 13, 16 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Tukes v. Dugger, 911
F.2d 508, 516 n.1I ( lIth Cir. 1990)).
131. This reasoning was cited most recently in Jenkins v. United States, Nos. 07-CF-488
& 07-CF 1353, slip op. at 4-8 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2010) (on file with author). See also Sprosty
v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 449 (6th
Cir. 1977); Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 194 (Fla. 2010) (citing reasoning from the lower
court's opinion on a related Fourth Amendment issue in Caldwell v. State, 985 So. 2d 602,
605-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)); People v. Bailey, 527 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846-48 (N.Y App.
Div. 1988); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 610 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); State
v. Martindale, No. 15687-7-11I, 1997 WL 705445, at *3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1997).
132. See Thomas, supra note 42, at 79-80.
133. See id. at 83.
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answers the officer's questions; and (5) a suspect answers, in part, to avoid
the threat. 134
In modem interrogation, in which officers rely mainly on psychological
rather than physical tactics, the first condition-an officer's threat-is satis-
fied by the implicit threat of continued interrogation. 35 "[An officer] implies
that he will continue the interrogation if [the suspect] does not answer to his
satisfaction."'' 36 But not all questioning by a law enforcement officer carries
the implicit threat of continued interrogation. The presence of an implicit
threat depends on a number of factors, such as the number of questions
asked, the location of the questioning, whether the suspect is under arrest,
and the officer's tone of voice. 3 7 These are similar to the factors that courts
have considered when looking at the question of custody' 38-not surprising
given that custody stands as a proxy for the type of environment in which
confessions are presumptively coerced. 1' 9
In the controversy at hand, an interview has to surpass some threshold
level to satisfy the implicit threat standard. Almost all the cases in which
controversies related to the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice have been litigated,
however, have involved formal but noncustodial stationhouse interviews
where the implicit threat is likely present. 40 The second condition is satis-
fied in modem interrogation because the threat renders remaining silent
substantially less eligible as a course of action; the officer is an "authority
figure who asks questions while expecting an answer."'14 ' The third condition
is met because the officer threatens continued interrogation in order to get
the suspect to answer.1 42 And as long as the suspect answers the officer's
questions, the fourth condition is satisfied. 143 Arguably, the only controver-
sial condition in the context of modem interrogation is the fifth:
causation.144
What Miranda imposed was a presumption regarding the fifth condition:
part of the suspect's reason for answering the questions must be to avoid the
threat. 14 "[I]n effect, [Miranda] held that condition 5 is satisfied in every
case involving custodial interrogation unless [the officer] gives the pre-
scribed warnings and obtains a waiver."' 14 6 In Miranda, a major shift in the
Court's understanding of coercion occurred: the mere knowledge of the
134. See id. (discussing all five steps).
135. Id. at 93.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
140. For a deeper treatment, see the cases cited supra notes 32-36.
141. Thomas, supra note 42, at 97.
142. Id. at 93.
143. Id. at 96.
144. Id. at 96-97.
145. Id. at 101.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
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right to resist interrogation became sufficient to rebut the presumption that
the suspect answers, at least in part, to avoid the threat of continued interro-
gation. 147 In turn, the knowledge of her rights signifies that the suspect
speaks in the absence of coercion. 148 We see from this account of coercion
why custody is crucial to the Court's analysis in Miranda and later cases. 149
For example, a suspect who is among bystanders at the scene of a crime
(noncustodial) likely does not answer questions out of fear of continued in-
terrogation, negating causation. 150 Thus, the causation element that is by
definition present in a custodial interview may not be present in a noncusto-
dial one. 1 '
The element of causation can be fulfilled by a coercive element other
than custody. In this case, the promise of the right to an attorney or the right
to remain silent, followed by a failure to stop questioning when either of
those rights is invoked, can be sufficient to fulfill the causation requirement.
For this to be true, the suspect must detect that the officer fails to do as
promised. As addressed above, when a person is promised the right to an
attorney and the right to remain silent, the Court works from the assumption
that she both understands the substance of those rights and relies on them in
her decisionmaking process.'5 2 Empirically speaking, this is true for most par-
ticipants in two psychological surveys.'53 One study conducted in 2001 found
that most suspects recognized the warnings as communicating that they have a
right to remain silent (around 81%) and a right to an attorney (around 95%).154
Further, a 2010 study consisting of a Miranda quiz administered to 149 pre-
trial defendants and 119 college students elaborated on the depth of
knowledge suspects have about the scope of these rights. 55 As far as the
right to counsel is concerned, most participants understood "that their re-
quest for an attorney should stop police questioning."'56 However, about
30% inaccurately believed that after they ask for an attorney, questioning
may continue until a lawyer is physically present.'57 As far as asserting their
rights after an initial agreement to talk, about 37% mistakenly believed that
147. Id. at 102.
148. See id.; see also id. at 97 ("It is not obvious that every [suspect] confesses during
interrogation in part to avoid (or lessen the likelihood of) continued interrogation. [The sus-
pect] might confess to clear her conscience, to save someone else from suspicion, or because
she is proud of what she has done.").
149. See id. at 101.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
153. See Rogers et al., supra note 121, at 302-03 (citing Richard Rogers et al., Miranda
Rights...and Wrongs: Myths, Methods, and Model Solutions, 23 CRIM. JUST. 4, 4-9 (2008)).
154. Id. at 302 (citing BELDEN, RUSSONELLO & STEWART, INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALY-
SIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY (2001), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf).
155. Id. at307-11.
156. Id. at311.
157. Id.
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they cannot reassert a right to silence, whereas only 12% believed that they
cannot reassert their right to legal counsel. 58
It appears, then, that the substantial majority of survey participants un-
derstand that police questioning should cease immediately after rights are
asserted.1 59 This population comprises the suspects who believe that they
have a right because they have been informed that they do, attempt to exer-
cise that right-either at the outset or later on in the interview-and are
ignored. They are the suspects who may speak because they believe that the
police have no intention of honoring any of the guarantees promised.' 6° The
other population, those who are not sure how the police are required to re-
spond to an assertion of their rights, 6' may not be as affected by this tactic.
The risk is nevertheless palpable that the vast majority of suspects, who un-
derstand that the police are required to cut off questioning, will believe that
they have no choice but to talk. The continued use of this tactic in custodial
interrogation to induce suspects to speak is a testament to its success. 162 For
example, the Mirandized noncustodial suspect who is denied an exercise of
her right to counsel was also informed of her right to silence. But given her
earlier attempts to exercise her right to an attorney, she believes the officer
will continue to question her regardless of her right. As was the impetus for
the imposition of Miranda,63 it will be almost impossible to tell after the
fact who spoke because of the coercive element just identified, and who
spoke as a result of her own free will to do so.
In sum, an overwhelming majority of suspects feel that they are in cus-
tody once the warnings are read. Further, when officers ignore suspects who
try to invoke an expressly promised right, they are creating a high risk of
coercion. The constitutional protections must respond accordingly.
III. STRATEGIES FOR PRACTITIONERS AND COURTS: ADVOCATING
A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF CUSTODY
The problems outlined in Part II suggest that courts should fashion rem-
edies to deter the police from administering warnings that they do not intend
to honor during interrogations that lack formal restraint. Courts addressing
admissibility under federal standards must ground their reasoning in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional requirements. 64 Conse-
158. Id.
159. See id. at 308-10 tbl.1, 311.
160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Section II.A.
163. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (describing the historical devel-
opment of the Miranda doctrine as it relates to the voluntariness standard that preceded it); see
also supra text accompanying note 62.
164. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190,
197 (1988). State courts, on the other hand, have the freedom to impose rules that are more
protective than Supreme Court precedent as long as they clearly rely on an adequate and inde-
pendent state ground. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); see also
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quently, these courts have two options: they can either couch their argu-
ments in terms of the Miranda doctrine or the voluntariness doctrine.
165
Ultimately, however, the solution that most closely aligns with the Court's
current approach and the evidence indicating a strong association between
the Miranda warnings and formal arrest is a rebuttable presumption that a
suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes once the warnings are adminis-
tered. This solution guarantees that the promises contained in the warnings
are honored, dispelling the potential for coercion outlined in Section II.B.
This Part applies this solution in light of the doctrinal considerations and
offers additional, though less desirable, possibilities.
A. Adding a Rebuttable Presumption to the Custodial Analysis
1. The Seibert Decision
A fairly recent case, Missouri v. Seibert, suggests a simple solution that
sounds in Miranda.66 In Seibert, the Supreme Court found that a police in-
terrogation tactic, which technically did not violate Miranda, was
nevertheless unconstitutional because it rendered the warnings entirely inef-
fective. 167 The "question-first" tactic at issue consisted of officers extracting
unwarned confessions during custodial interrogations, reading the warnings
midinterrogation, and then extracting the same confessions anew in the
same sitting. 168 While the first confession was inadmissible as a violation of
Miranda,69 courts were split over whether the second confession could be
admitted. 7 ° The Supreme Court determined that it could not. 7 ' No rationale
in this opinion, however, carried a clear majority.
The Court's holding was limited by its earlier opinion in Oregon v. El-
stad.172 In Elstad, police arrested a burglary suspect at his home.173 An
officer, before administering Miranda warnings, explained to the suspect
that he was under suspicion of burglary, to which the suspect responded that
he had been at the scene. 174 Then, at the beginning of a later interview con-
ducted at the stationhouse, different officers administered the warnings and
Christopher D. Totten, Commentary, New Federalism and Our Constitutional Rights in the
Criminal Context, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 515 (2010).
165. See supra Section I.A.
166. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The analogies drawn to the Missouri v. Seibert case were
brought to my attention in email conversation with Professor David Moran on April 14, 2011
(on file with author).
167. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611.
168. See id. at 609-11.
169. Id. at 604.
170. Id. at 607.
171. Id.
172. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
173. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301.
174. Id.
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obtained a full confession. 75 The Court held that the connection between
the unwarned and warned statements was "speculative and attenuated at
best," and thus the second statement did not need to be excluded. 76
Three of the five majority votes in Seibert, supplied by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, found that "when Miranda warnings are inserted in
the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to
mislead and 'deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to
understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning
them."'77 In distinguishing Seibert from Elstad, the Justices distilled a num-
ber of relevant factors from the cases to be used to determine whether the
warnings are effective: (1) the "completeness and detail" of the unwarned
interrogation; (2) the "overlapping content"; (3) the "timing and setting" of
the first statement as compared to the second; (4) the "continuity of police
personnel"; and (5) "the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated
the second round as continuous with the first." 78 While in Elstad these fac-
tors pointed against extending Miranda to exclude the statement, in Seibert
these factors rendered the confession inadmissible: the warnings were given
after a full, unwarned confession that took place in the same setting with the
same officers, and which covered the same ground as the first interrogation,
rendering it continuous with the first.' 79
Justices Breyer and Kennedy, who each wrote opinions concurring in the
judgment, supplied the last two votes of the majority. Justice Breyer wrote
separately to emphasize his ideal resolution: that the subsequent confession
should be excluded unless "the failure to warn was in good faith."180 Justice
Kennedy took Breyer's approach even further. He wanted a rule whereby
only deliberate attempts to circumvent Miranda would carry a presumption
of exclusion. 181 Even given a deliberate circumvention, exclusion under Jus-
tice Kennedy's approach could be avoided by curative measures-such as an
admonition that the unwarned statement could not be used, a large break in
time, or a change in officers or context.'82 Balancing legitimate law en-
forcement interests in conducting investigations against the purposes of
Miranda,'83 Justice Kennedy concluded that the question-first technique was
one such deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda. 84 But he found Elstad
175. Id. at314-15.
176. Id. at 313-14.
177. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613-14 (2004); see also id. at 604-17.
178. Id. at 615.
179. Id. at 617. As even Justice Kennedy commented, the second interrogation in Seibert
resembled a cross-examination where the suspect was confronted with inconsistencies in her
earlier prewarning statement. Id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 619-20.
184. Id. at 620-21.
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controlling absent proof that the technique was deliberately used to evade
Miranda.185
2. Extending Seibert to Create a Rebuttable Presumption
Both the logic of the plurality in Seibert and the logic of Justice Kenne-
dy's concurrence counsel in favor of adopting a rebuttable presumption of
custody in response to the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice. Once a person has
been read the warnings, a court should presume that that person is in custo-
dy for purposes of Miranda absent proof to the contrary. This solution has
been termed a "'transformation' argument," in which the "reading of the
Miranda rights transform[s] an otherwise noncustodial interrogation into a
custodial interrogation, one in which a suspect deserves Miranda's protec-
tions. ' 186 Effectively, the Justices in Seibert extended the Miranda doctrine
to exclude a statement when the technical requirements of Miranda were
not met, and the suggested presumption would so extend Miranda to the
controversy at issue in this Note. The plurality in Seibert found that the
question-first tactic contravened the purposes of Miranda because it effec-
tively "misle[d] and deprive[d]" a suspect of her choice to speak."87
Similarly, the problems outlined in Part II demonstrate that administering
the Miranda warnings without honoring them contravenes the purposes of
Miranda by leaving suspects vulnerable to coercion. In the same vein,
courts should extend Miranda's protections to suspects who are given
Miranda warnings, whether officers are required to read the warnings or not.
Justice Kennedy's approach adds another consideration before extending
Miranda: he requires a balancing of the legitimate interests of the state
against the risks that the practice will coerce the suspect into speaking.'88 In
this case, the balancing of factors favors the proposed presumption. While
the risks have been discussed at length, the possibility of a countervailing,
legitimate interest has not. For example, statements obtained in violation of
Miranda can be used for impeachment purposes but not in the prosecution's
case-in-chief, because the "truth-finding" function of the trial wins out over
the Miranda violation. 189 There is also an exception to Miranda to protect
the public safety in cases where extreme swiftness is required to prevent
further violence or to save a life.' 9° Finally, physical evidence obtained be-
cause of Miranda violations is also admissible, because the probative use of
the evidence is considered more important to the fact-finder than the possi-
ble deterrent effect of enforcing Miranda. 191
185. Id. at 622.
186. United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1051 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000).
187. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613-14.
188. See id. at 619 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189. Id. (citing Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
190. See id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)).
191. See id. (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)).
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In this case, the only legitimate, countervailing interest offered has been
that of incentivizing officers to be overly protective in reading the warn-
ings. 9 2 That interest, however, is not actually present here. The following set
of factual considerations also demonstrates how even Justice Kennedy's
more stringent "deliberate circumvention" test can be met. As the preceding
discussions in this Note have highlighted, there are many circumstances in
which determining whether a person is in custody proves to be a difficult
task, unpredictable at the time of interrogation. In situations where custody
is unclear, courts want officers to err on the side of caution and administer
the warnings. 193 In these situations where officers are in fact being benevo-
lent, they will likely also carry through with obtaining a valid waiver and
honoring an invocation. Thus, it will be simple for the government to satisfy
its burden of showing a valid waiver. But this controversy only arises as a
legal issue when the suspect refuses to waive or invokes her rights and is
then ignored. In these scenarios, if an officer gives the warnings and then
ignores a request because the person was not in custody, that same officer
had to know the warnings were superfluous. 94 This knowledge is proof of a
strong likelihood that the officer is engaged in the kind of bad faith trends
reviewed in Part II, the same sort of actions which both the plurality and
Justice Kennedy in Seibert found violative of Miranda. The Davis v.
Allsbrooks practice is similar to and derivative of the studied, documented,
and purposefully employed tactics designed to undermine Miranda: for ex-
ample, orchestrating nominally noncustodial interrogations; 9 ' giving the
warnings only when the officer thinks she has a cooperative witness; 196 and
intentional "questioning outside Miranda."'97
Additionally, the potential loss of trustworthy confession evidence al-
ways works against exclusion. 98 But because of a high risk of coercion, the
balance here, as in Seibert, favors exclusion to deter use of the Davis v.
Allsbrooks practice.
A rebuttable presumption serves multiple goals. 99 Most importantly, it
prevents officers from ignoring promised rights, which is the moment when
192. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
194. A change in personnel could add another wrinkle to the question of whether an
officer made a deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda. However, this factor would come
into play during the rebuttal stage and so would not be necessary to factor into the question of
deliberate circumvention.
195. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions-Andfrom Miranda, 88 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497,498 (1998).
199. The general rationale for rebuttable presumptions, more common in civil litigation,
is fourfold: to serve policy interests, to recognize what is most probably true across a wide
range of cases, to place the burden of proof on the party most likely to have access to the in-
formation, and to assist in cases where definitive proof is not available. See CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 686-87 (7th ed. 2011).
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the serious risk of coercion arises, since officers will not be able to legally
question a suspect after a clear request for counsel or to remain silent.
20 0
Imposing a presumption would serve the goal of recognizing what is most
probably true throughout a range of cases: given that the Miranda warnings
are widely associated with the spectacle of formal arrest, a reasonable per-
son would assume that she is under arrest, and therefore in custody, upon
hearing the warnings. 20 1 In addition, the determination of when a person is
in custody is heavily litigated, with similar factual scenarios in interroga-
tions producing different results across jurisdictions. 212 It follows that
employing some easy-to-identify standards could alleviate problems in case
resolution. Finally, and most importantly, a presumption would maintain the
robust nature of the Fifth Amendment as it applies to statements made dur-
ing police interrogation generally.
A rebuttable presumption would also give a reviewing court proper flex-
ibility. It would be difficult to argue that, without any of the other formalities
of arrest, a person would feel as if she were in custody based solely on the
administration of the warnings, making a rebuttable presumption more ap-
propriate. For example, it would be too hard to predict without knowing
more surrounding facts how a reasonable person might react to an officer
who states both the Miranda warnings and the Beheler admonishment-
which includes reminding the suspect she is free to leave to avoid a custodi-
al situation.203 In State v. Daughtry, officers informed Daughtry that he was
not under arrest and could leave-the Beheler admonition-but also
instructed him that he had the right to an attorney and the right to remain
silent.2" Daughtry agreed to waive his rights. 205 He later stated "I think I
need to speak to a lawyer,' '206 but officers did not cease questioning and he
confessed to murder.207 Importantly, in his suppression hearing, Daughtry
testified that he knew he was free to leave, demonstrating that the hypothet-
ical reasonable person in his position may not be in custody.20 8 In essence, a
200. For a justification of federal courts' authority to adopt this approach, see Strauss,
supra note 164, at 194-96. Strauss argued that constitutional rules that prohibit more conduct
than what directly contravenes a constitutional clause are "the norm, not the exception." Id. at
195. Further, such rules are legitimate so long as they "reflect[] ... a genuine effort to mini-
mize the sum of administrative costs and error costs," and not simply the Court's
determination that the world might be better if officials, such as police officers, followed the
rule. Id. at 194-96. For a more critical approach of this practice, see Klein, supra note 79, at
1030.
201. See supra Section II.B.I.
202. Blum, supra note 121, at 1.
203. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text; see also State v. Daughtry, 459
S.E.2d 747, 754-56 (N.C. 1995).
204. Daughtry, 459 S.E.2d at 754-56.
205. Id. at 754.
206. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. at 754-55.
208. Id. at 755.
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rebuttable presumption rebuffs the potential complaint that no one factor
should be determinative of custody under Miranda.09
The types of counterproof would draw from the other circumstances that
already bear on a determination of custody and the curative measures men-
tioned in Justice Kennedy's approach in Seibert.2"' First is the use of the
Beheler admonition.211 The Court made clear that failing to tell a suspect she
is free to leave-the Beheler admonition-would not conclusively indicate
that a suspect is in custody; however, it is a significant factor in the Court's
estimation.2 12 The admonition here could communicate the exact opposite of
what most people understand when they hear the warnings-i.e., that they
are under arrest. In addition, time, setting, and officer personnel could come
into play during rebuttal. After a personnel change, the suspect may no
longer rely on the same promises as earlier. A gap in time or a change in
setting may make the warnings less present in a suspect's mind. In sum, the
presence of these factors could lessen the effect of the warnings, which fa-
vors a rebuttable presumption. 213
B. Alternative Solutions
There are a number of alternative though less desirable solutions that
courts have employed. First, as discussed in Section III.B. 1, there is the pos-
sibility of crafting a new rule for ease of administration: regardless of a
finding of custody or voluntariness, any invocation must be honored after
officers give the warnings. 214 Section III.B.2 introduces another approach,
which examines the administration of the warnings as just one factor among
many that contributes to the circumstances of whether someone is in custo-
dy-the "factor approach. 12 5 Finally, Section III.B.3 shows that the
voluntariness doctrine could be extended to include a presumption analo-
gous to the one proposed under custody.2 16
1. Freestanding Exclusionary Rule
A freestanding exclusionary rule lacks a place in any already cognizable
doctrinal framework, making it difficult for courts using a federal standard
209. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (referring
to the "'totality of circumstances' in determining whether a suspect is 'in custody' ").
210. See supra notes 69-70, 180 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) (finding that it was
reasonable for the state court of appeals to conclude that the suspect was not in custody even
though he had not been informed directly he was free to leave, but also weighing the failure to
tell the suspect as pointing toward a finding that he was in custody).
213. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
214. E.g., Exparte Comer, 591 So. 2d 13, 15-16, 16 n.2 (Ala. 1991).
215. E.g., Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F3d 635,642 (7th Cir. 1996).
216. At least one state court has approved weighing the reading of the Miranda factors
in a voluntariness inquiry. State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229 (N.D. 1991).
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to adopt. This rule would exclude any statement made as a result of contin-
ued interrogation after a suspect requests an attorney or to remain silent
under the circumstances, regardless of a finding of custody. Thus far, only
the Alabama Supreme Court has adopted such a remedy.2"7 In Ex parte
Comer, the petitioner was convicted of arson and appealed the use at trial of
a statement she made to officers.2 18 An officer had interrogated Comer at the
local fire department the day after a fire had occurred at her business.
21 9
Comer was read her Miranda rights, and when asked if she wanted to speak
with the officers, she stated, "I really don't care to. '220 Officers continued to
question her, and she gave a statement that was later used to impeach her
testimony at trial.22 The Alabama Supreme Court determined that the record
on appeal was not sufficient to decide whether Comer was in custody at the
time of her interrogation, 222 but it found that she had clearly invoked her
right to remain silent 223 and that continued questioning was therefore im-
proper because of the risk of coercion. 224 The court stated that custody was
not crucial to its holding: "[O]nce a police officer informs a person of his or
her rights under Miranda, the police must honor that person's exercise of
those rights even if the individual is not in custody. 225
There are two problems with this approach. The same concerns about
adopting a conclusive presumption apply here. While simple, it fails to ac-
count for many other circumstances that could obviate the need to exclude
the statement. 2 6 But it also departs from the frameworks already established
by abandoning the question of custody. In other words, it is less desirable
because it requires a larger doctrinal shift than necessary to reach a solution.
2. Factor Approach
A more flexible approach would factor the administration of the warnings
into a totality-of-the-circumstances determination of what constitutes custo-
dy-the "factor approach." While this seems to be similar to the solution
advocated above, courts that have used this mechanism tend to overlook the
actual significance of administering the warnings, making this a less-than-
adequate solution to the problems outlined in Part II. The Seventh Circuit
highlighted an application of the factor approach in a state conviction on
habeas review. 227 In Sprosty v. Buchler, the issue arose during the execution of
217. Comer, 591 So. 2d at 15-16, 16 n.2.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Id.
220. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 15.
223. Id. at 16.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
226. See supra notes 203-213 and accompanying text.
227. Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1996).
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a search warrant at Sprosty's home.128 Officers arrived as Sprosty was sitting
in a car in his driveway; they blocked his car in, read him the terms of the
search warrant, accompanied him into the house, and then informed him of
his Miranda rights; he signed a paper stating that he had read and understood
them, although it is not clear whether he waived his rights.2 9 An officer re-
mained with Sprosty during the three-hour search warrant execution; Sprosty
only left the officer's presence when accompanied by two other officers to his
bedroom. 3° The appellate court affirmed the determination that Sprosty was
in custody,231 because officers initially barred his path upon arrival, an armed
officer exclusively guarded Sprosty for three hours during the search, officers
made persistent requests for Sprosty to lead them to incriminating evidence,
and officers formally administered the Miranda warnings at the initiation of
the encounter.
232
The main problem with this approach is that it fails to provide specific
guidance, allowing courts to simply overlook the relevance of the warnings
altogether.233 Many courts at the state and federal level agree that the warn-
ings should factor into a determination of custody.234 In practice, however,
these same courts fail to actually analyze the warnings as part of the deter-
mination of custody in a significant way.235 The Davis v. Allsbrooks case
discussed in the Introduction presents a particularly egregious example of
this problem. 236 The Fourth Circuit in Davis relied heavily on the apparent
cooperation of the defendant with the police when it found that Davis was
not in custody.237 Although Davis appeared at the stationhouse voluntarily,
the Fourth Circuit may have reached a different conclusion had it focused on
the following facts: Davis underwent two two-hour interrogation sessions in
one evening at the stationhouse; officers went to pick him up at night after he
did not return; officers escorted Davis to the bathroom; and officers never in-
formed him that he was not under arrest.2 38 Most damaging in Davis was that
the court analyzed the reading of the warnings separately from the other cir-
cumstances--despite purporting to use a totality-of-the-circumstances
228. Id. at 638.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 643 (distinguishing the facts of this case from United States v. Bums, 37 F.3d
276 (7th Cir. 1994)).
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1985).
234. See, e.g., Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 642 (emphasizing that where the issue of custody is not
clear, the reading of Miranda warnings should factor into a totality-of-the-circumstances
determination as to whether an individual should be considered in custody for purposes of
Miranda); Davis, 778 F.2d at 172 & n.1; see also United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140,
1149 (10th Cir. 1998); Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 202 (Fla. 2010) (relating to a similar
determination of custody under the Fourth Amendment).
235. See supra note 234.
236. See supra Introduction.
237. Davis, 778 F.2d at 171.
238. See id. at 171-72.
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inquiry-when it asked "whether the reading of Miranda warnings to a sus-
pect should by itself create custody. 2 39 This approach effectively allowed the
court to avoid properly weighing the warnings as a factor in its totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis.
In a rebuttable presumption, however, the Miranda warnings as a factor
cannot be ignored, and countercircumstances can be presented. This takes
care of the issue of deciding whether the reading of the warnings alone cre-
ates custody. Thus, if custody is the avenue of resolution, a presumption
needs to be employed in order to prevent courts from giving lip service to,
but actually ignoring, the reading of the warnings in these contexts.
3. Solution Under Voluntariness
Finally, courts could implement a presumption of involuntariness when
interrogation continues after a request for counsel or to remain silent under
the circumstances. This approach is attractive given the current state of the
Miranda case law, which allows officers to engage in practices that "under-
mine Miranda's goals." 24° It is unsurprising, then, that some scholars have
generally advocated imposing standards for police behavior under the vol-
untariness doctrine rather than further developing Miranda.24
At least one court has applied a voluntariness analysis to the problem at
issue in this Note, while another has alluded to its efficacy.242 The North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that in a noncustodial interrogation in
which the Miranda warnings are administered, an officer's disregard for
invocations of a right to counsel or a right to remain silent is a "relevant fac-
tor[] in evaluating the voluntariness of any incriminating statements. '243 In
the pre-Miranda landscape, actual requests for an attorney or to remain si-
lent were important points of inquiry in the voluntariness analysis.2' And
"by the end of the pre-Miranda era, the police were essentially required to
honor a suspect's decision to refuse to submit to police interrogation, a posi-
tion consistent with Miranda's subsequent recognition of the suspect's right
to remain silent. 245
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has heard few interrogation cases
under the voluntariness standard.2 46 In one such case, Mincey v. Arizona, the
239. See id. at 172 (emphasis added).
240. Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 1541; see Clymer, supra note 107; White, supra note
45, at 2004 n.19, 2056-57; supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
241. See generally White, supra note 45.
242. State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229 (N.D. 1991); see also Davis, 778 F.2d at
171-72, 172 n.l (borrowing from the language of voluntariness in its custodial analysis and
finding that after officers repeatedly deny requests, the "clash of wills" over a suspect's desire
to remain silent could create a custodial situation).
243. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d at 229.
244. White, supra note 45, at 2010.
245. Id. at 2011.
246. Id. at 2014-15 (noting three cases). Since White's article, the Court decided Chavez
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
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Court held a confession involuntary where detectives interrogated a suspect
who was seriously wounded and in the intensive care unit over the suspect's
written objection that he did not want to say more without a lawyer.247 The
Court found that "Mincey was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from
family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious, and his will was
simply overborne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained as
these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant at his trial. '248 In
Colorado v. Connelly, the Court clarified that the voluntariness inquiry is
concerned with curtailing "certain interrogation techniques, either in isola-
tion or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, [that]
are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be con-
demned. 24
9
Because the post-Miranda voluntariness landscape has remained rela-
tively undeveloped by the Supreme Court,2 5 0 lower courts have room to
adopt rules that offer more protection than a variable totality-of-the-
circumstances approach . 25 The rules should be aimed at the police practices
that are most likely to induce false confessions.2 5 2 First, involuntary confes-
sion cases at common law excluded confessions stemming from the police
methods likely to produce false or untrustworthy confessions. 2 3 Second,
this interpretation comports with the modem understanding of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, which "has been interpreted to require that the government
employ procedures that will protect the innocent. '254 Because jurors tend "to
regard confessions as the most ... damning evidence of guilt," statements
obtained as a result of police methods that are known to produce untrust-
worthy statements could be excluded to prevent fact-finders from according
improper weight to unreliable yet highly damaging evidence. 55
It is, however, difficult to pinpoint the exact factors in a given confession
that lead an innocent person to incriminate herself, but patterns have
emerged, allowing scholars to identify problematic interrogation tech-
niques.25 6 One study gathered sixty confessions that shared the common
characteristic that "an individual was arrested primarily because police ob-
tained an inculpatory statement that later turned out to be a proven, or
highly likely, false confession. '257 The police tactics leading to these false
247. 437 U.S. 385, 396, 399, 401 (1978).
248. ld. at 401-02.
249. 479 U.S 157, 163 (1986) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).
250. State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 803 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (noting that the
Court has "yet to define the permissible limits of police trickery").
251. Id. (adopting a rule making the use of fabricated evidence a per se voluntariness
violation).
252. White, supra note 45.
253. Id. at 2039.
254. Id. at2013.
255. Id. (quoting Leo & Ofshe, supra note 8, at 476) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. at 2042.
257. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 8, at 436.
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confessions were lengthy interrogations, 258 confessions induced by promises
of leniency or threats of harsher punishment for remaining silent,259 and
trickery designed to "misrepresent evidence of [a] suspect's guilt.' '26 Police
promises of leniency and threats of harsher punishment are most applicable
to the controversy at hand. There are three notable cases in this category
from the sixty-case study:2 61 a threat of the death penalty to coerce a confes-
sion,2 62 a threat of the electric chair,263 and a threat of sending the suspect's
girlfriend to prison for murder instead. 264
As discussed, the Davis v. Allsbrooks practice is an implicit threat: by
expressly promising a right and then denying it, the officer communicates
that the suspect must answer or questioning will continue.265 The tactic is
different in kind from the threats discussed above, and it has yet to generate
any empirical studies of its potential to elicit false confessions. 266 But the
concern over respecting a suspect's desire to remain silent has a foundation
in the pre-Miranda voluntariness cases, 267 a concern which continues post-
Miranda.268 Furthermore, some courts have suggested that interrogation
techniques that overbear a suspect's desire to remain silent or to speak only
through the presence of counsel do present voluntariness problems that can
occur even in noncustodial scenarios. 269 Here, the risk of overbearing a sus-
pect's will is high. Judging from the coercive pressure formed by denying an
expressly promised right, the practice could easily form the basis for a rule
of exclusion under voluntariness. Again, the totality-of-the-circumstances
voluntariness inquiry is too weak for the same reasons that a similar holistic
approach fails under a custody analysis. 270 So a presumption could be em-
ployed here, as under a custodial solution, to avoid the latter problem.
271
The difficulty with the voluntariness approach is that it would require
major shifts in the Court's jurisprudence. First, imposing a voluntariness bar
would exclude the statement from use for any purpose, whereas continued
interrogation in custodial interrogation (after a suspect refuses to waive her
rights or later invokes a right after the warnings are read) generally only
258. White, supra note 45, at 2046-49.
259. Id. at 2050-53.
260. Id. at 2053-56.
261. White, supra note 45, at 2050 n.276 (citing Leo & Ofshe, supra note 8, at 466,
470-71,475-76).
262. Id. (citing Leo & Ofshe, supra note 8, at 475-76).
263. Id. (citing Leo & Ofshe, supra note 8, at 466).
264. Id. (citing Leo & Ofshe, supra note 8, at 470-71).
265. See supra Section II.B.1.
266. See White, supra note 45, at 2041.
267. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978).
269. See supra note 242.
270. See supra Section II.A.
271. See supra Section III.A.2.
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excludes a statement from the prosecution's case-in-chief.27 2 The voluntari-
ness approach would necessarily apply to custodial interrogations as well,
meaning the invocation rules in custodial interrogations would have to
change accordingly. Second, it would require extending voluntariness to
cover situations in which officers use less egregious tactics than the Court
has previously proscribed under a voluntariness framework.2 3
On a positive note, this approach could be more efficient since it would
require addressing the effect of gratuitous warnings only at the point when a
suspect clearly tries to exercise a promised right.274 Additionally, a voluntar-
iness rule that transcends the boundaries of custodial and noncustodial
interrogations would not only resolve the controversy over the Davis v.
Allsbrooks practice but would also deter the undesirable tactic of intentional
questioning outside Miranda.275
CONCLUSION
This Note offers a few solutions to the problems presented by the Davis v.
Allsbrooks practice, solutions that would reverse the current course of inaction
and satisfactorily preserve a suspect's rights against self-incrimination under
the circumstances. It may be better in the long run for courts to expand the
boundaries of the voluntariness doctrine. But using a rebuttable presumption
that a person is in custody once the warnings are administered is the solution
advocated here. It requires little retooling and stands on strong empirical
ground. Courts must look beyond the presumption that gratuitous warnings
only serve to benefit suspects by dispelling compulsion. In fact, courts must
first recognize that the warnings strongly signify formal arrest. And second,
that failing to implement a safeguard against officers administering warnings
that they do not intend to honor leaves suspects at risk of coercion. In a broad-
er sense, the warnings could be reduced to meaningless formalities if courts
continue to allow officers to recite their words in situations where they have
no obligation to honor them. Surely, the use of the warnings as empty prom-
ises is contrary to the purposes of Miranda.
272. Weisselberg, supra note 30, at 127-29.
273. See supra notes 246-249.
274. Available studies show that upwards of 80 percent of those given the Miranda
warnings maintain a valid waiver throughout the interrogation. Cassell & Hayman, supra note
9, at 858-60.
275. There has been a call to roll back the decisions allowing for use of statements ob-
tained through "questioning outside Miranda" for impeachment and other purposes based on
the fact that the limited exclusion of statements from the prosecution's case-in-chief has led to
"deliberate disregard" for Miranda. See Weisselberg, supra note 30, at 139-40.
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